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Sarah A. Treul, University of North Carolina at Chapel HillAs public opinion in the United States has shifted on questions of gay rights in the last decade, some members of Con-
gress have likewise adjusted their behavior to address issues of concern to their lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) con-
stituents. We argue that the number of LGB constituents in a district affects the representatives’ behavior. Although the
size of the LGB population positively affects the substantive representation members provide to their LGB constituents,
population is conditioned by majority public opinion on LGB issues in determining members’ low-cost, symbolic rep-
resentation of LGB constituents. More favorable majority attitudes toward the minority allow the member to provide
more symbolic representation to LGB constituents through low-cost gestures and actions. Statistical tests examining
the effects of minority population and public opinion on House members’ voting records, bill sponsorships and co-
sponsorships, and caucus memberships from 2005 to 2011 provide support for our hypotheses.inority groups in the United States, particularly
racial and sexual minorities, face significant ob-
stacles to extracting favorable policy outcomes from
institutions such as Congress, where majorities determine
policy outcomes. Groups that have descriptive representa-
tion in legislative institutions are able to overcome some
barriers; group members provide a voice for the group
through floor debate, bill sponsorships, and behind-the-
scenes interactions between members (Canon 1999; Grose
2011; Haider-Markel 2010). However, minority descriptive
representatives alone cannot pass legislation favorable to
their group. For this to happen, representatives must win the
support of some members of the majority. Thus, majority
representatives potentially sympathetic to the minority serve
as policy gatekeepers. Understanding the motivations of this
subset of lawmakers to support the minority is key to un-
derstanding how minority-preferred policy becomes law.
We propose that members of Congress, primarily moti-
vated by reelection (Mayhew 1974), represent minority con-
stituencies on the basis of two related factors: the popula-
tion of the minority in their districts and the attitudes of the
majority of voters in the district toward that minority. With
a greater minority population in the constituency, membersEric R. Hansen (ehansen@live.unc.edu) is a PhD student in political science at the
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sentation through their legislative activities. However, ma-
jority public attitudes can condition the relationship between
minority population and representation. Members have elec-
toral motivations to be responsive to majority attitudes when
providing high-salience, low-cost symbolic representation of
minority groups. Because symbolic acts are public and de-
signed to appeal to a wide range of citizens,members use these
low-cost activities to convince as many members of their
district as possible that they “stand for them” (Pitkin 1967).
Thus, for members to engage in symbolic acts supporting the
minority, they should also have the support of the majority.
However, when it comes to providing low-salience, high-
cost substantive representation, members are better able to
achieve electoral goals by responding to sizable minorities
with intensely held views (Bishin 2009). Therefore, the sub-
stantive representation of minority groups relies more on
the size of the minority in the district and its perceived im-
portance to the member’s electoral prospects (Bishin 2009;
Canon 1999; Lublin 1997). This distinction will be discussed
in greater detail below.
We further develop and test our account by analyzing
the relationship between LGB (lesbian, gay, and bisexual)University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599. Sarah
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resentatives.1 We examine the conditional effects of minor-
ity population and majority public opinion on two forms of
symbolic representation (position taking and caucus mem-
bership) and one form of substantive representation (bill
sponsorship). We find that the minority population of a
district positively influences the symbolic and substantive
representation provided to the group by the district’s elected
representative. When it comes to symbolic representation,
the effect of the LGB population is conditioned upon dis-
trict majority opinion on gay rights issues. The marginal ef-
fect of a LGB population on its symbolic representation is
smaller in districts where majority opinion already aligns in
favor of gay rights legislation but larger in districts where
majority opinion opposes the expansion of gay rights. How-
ever, we find that substantive representation does not hinge
onpublic opinion. Rather, it depends upon the electoral power
of the minority within a district, as well as the descriptive
representation of the minority in Congress. The results im-
ply that minority populations can have a direct effect on
their representation in Congress, no matter their size, though
that effect may not be strong enough to sway skeptical rep-
resentatives.
REPRESENTATION OF MINORITY GROUPS
Majoritarianism is the foundation of democratic theory.
The principle of majoritarianism holds that elected officials
make decisions that support the preferences of a majority of
their constituents. Given that legislators are rational seekers
of reelection (Mayhew 1974), the principle of majoritari-
anism conforms with the notion that legislators act to max-
imize voter support by taking positions in line with those of
the majority of their electorate. However, recent scholarship
demonstrates that elected officials occasionally take posi-
tions that run counter to majority opinion (Adams, Bishin,1. While lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals are often grouped with
trans* people under the broader LGBT label, we limit our analysis only to
LGB representation in Congress for several reasons. While Congress has
addressed relatively few matters of sexual orientation, it has addressed
even fewer matters of gender identity. Legislators frequently consider the
subjects as separate policy domains; bills sponsored and brought to a vote
often address sexual orientation and neglect gender identity. Unlike LGBs,
trans* people have had no descriptive representation in Congress in the
legislature’s history. Even compared to LGBs, the population of trans*
people is estimated to be incredibly small; the Human Rights Campaign
estimates it between 0.25% and 1% of the American population. Although
congressional representation of the interests of trans* people is an issue
meriting scholarly attention, we consider the populations and interests of
LGBs and trans* people to be sufficiently different to merit separate anal-
yses. The trans* label is used metaphorically to capture all of the identities
that fall outside of traditional gender norms.and Dow 2004; Bishin 2009; Lax and Phillips 2012) and that
they will represent a minority group’s preferences through
their official activities (Grose 2011; Lublin 1997). Given ma-
joritarianism, why is it that elected officials occasionally de-
cide to buck popular opinion and favor policies that a mi-
nority group supports? Answering this question will help to
explain why, despite their historic underrepresentation in
American political institutions, minority groups have been
able to extract some favored policies from legislatures.
In addition to simply supporting majority-preferred leg-
islation, another way for legislators to maximize voter sup-
port in an election is to cobble together support from dif-
ferent subconstituencies until the reelection constituency is
sufficiently large enough to return the representatives to
office (Bishin 2009; Bishin and Smith 2013). Thus, under the
subconstituency theory, minority voters can form a signifi-
cant portion of a candidate’s reelection constituency, allow-
ing legislators to occasionally disregard majority opinion to
support the minority (Bishin and Smith 2013). Additionally,
the subconstituency theory of representation holds that mi-
nority groups that are engaged and active on particular is-
sues are more likely to receive representation on those is-
sues in the legislature (Bishin 2000, 2009; Bishin and Smith
2013). Legislators may respond to the minority constitu-
ency in their districts by siding with them on floor votes or
sponsoring bills the minority favors, much the same way
they may respond to other subsets of their broader constit-
uency (Fenno 1978; Grose 2011). Minority groups are im-
portant to legislators given that they are behaving in an
environment of electoral uncertainty (Fenno 1978). Given
this uncertainty, legislators are interested in winning the
support of as many constituents as possible to help secure the
vote. Therefore, even minority groups can become an im-
portant voting bloc in the eyes of the legislator. If the legis-
lator can demonstrate her support for the group’s interests
and goals, the legislator can likely secure the minority’s vote.
When majority opinion in a congressional district con-
flicts with the interests of the minority, the representative
must focus her activities on representing the interests of
the majority or else risk losing majority electoral support. If
the two sets of interests do not conflict, or the majority is
supportive of or indifferent toward the interests of the mi-
nority, then the representative may focus her activities on
providing representation to both groups in an attempt to
maximize electoral support. Thus, when majority opinion
favors the minority, the minority is able to reap the repre-
sentational benefits regardless of its population size. Fur-
thermore, the legislator’s consideration of the majority’s
opinion will be contingent upon the type of representation
the member is providing.
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Representation can be provided in many forms (Canon 1999;
Hall 1996; Pitkin 1967). Pitkin (1967) conceives of represen-
tation taking four forms: formalistic, descriptive, symbolic,
and substantive. To answer our question of why members
represent minority groups, we adopt Pitkin’s theoretical
framework and focus our attention on symbolic and sub-
stantive representation. Each is a form of representation that
all members of Congress can provide to minority constit-
uents, regardless of their own social groupmembership, while
in office.2 By another account, substantive and symbolic rep-
resentation both fall into the category of “policy representa-
tion,” by which members address constituents’ policy con-
cerns (Harden 2013).
Symbolic representation constitutes a low hurdle of rep-
resentation that many members of Congress can easily clear.
According to Pitkin (1967), symbolic representation is the
way a representative “stands for” the represented. By Pit-
kin’s definition, symbolic representation does not require
the representative to act in a way that furthers the interests
of the represented. Rather, it only requires the belief of the
represented that their agent shares their interests. Conse-
quently, any gesture that symbolizes a commitment to the
group or symbolizes an ideal that the group espouses could
be taken as symbolic representation. Members of Congress
frequently perform such low-cost, symbolic acts to appeal to
constituents, like naming post offices after district commu-
nity leaders, cosponsoring bills important to their constitu-
ency, or casting votes on symbolic resolutions. Symbolic
acts are, almost by definition, public acts meant to appeal
to a wide range of citizens. Members have an incentive to
make these acts appeal to as many citizens as possible in
order to convince a maximum number of constituents that
the member “stands for” them. Symbolic representation is
likely to be given to a large number of subconstituencies,
given its low cost to the member and given members’ elec-
toral incentives to maximize support among various sub-
constituencies (Bishin 2009). Thus, we expect that symbolic
representation can be given to both majority and minority
groups in a constituency, provided that a symbolic act meant
to appeal to one group does not alienate the other group
from the member.2. Descriptive representation gives social groups a voice in political
institutions (e.g., Bratton and Haynie 1999; Haider-Markel 2010; Mans-
bridge 1999). We take descriptive representation into account in our sta-
tistical models below. Formalistic representation describes citizens’ au-
thorization of members to represent them in political institutions through
elections and is thus irrelevant to our discussion of what members do while
in office.In contrast, substantive representation is the extent to
which the representative actively works to advance the pol-
icy preferences of the represented (Pitkin 1967). Substantive
representation becomes manifest in high-cost, low-salience
activities like bill sponsorship. Such activities require a sub-
stantial commitment of members’ time and resources (Schil-
ler 1995). Different than symbolic representation because of
its high-cost nature, substantive representation hinges more
upon the involvement of passionate, committed groups lob-
bying members to take specific actions to support the group.
The members most willing to give substantive representa-
tion to a group, especially a minority group, likely fall into
two categories. First, there are those who have a significant
electoral stake in representing the minority because the mi-
nority constitutes a large proportion of their constituency
(Bishin 2009; Canon 1999; Lublin 1997; Swain 1993). That
is, those members who believe the minority group in the
district makes up a significant portion of the their reelection
constituency (Fenno 1978) are more likely to engage in the
higher-cost form of representation (Bishin 2009). Second,
there are those who have a personal stake in its represen-
tation because they belong to the minority group (Haider-
Markel 2010; Reynolds 2013). Thus, substantive represen-
tation of minority groups depends more on the size and
commitment of the minority than it does on the attitudes of
the majority.
Hypotheses
We expect that minority population and majority public
opinion differently affect the symbolic and substantive rep-
resentational behaviors that a member engages in. The dis-
cussion above leads us to generate two hypotheses:
H1. A larger district minority group population leads
to more symbolic representation provided by the mem-
ber, conditioned upon positive attitudes of the majority
toward the minority group.
More favorable majority attitudes toward a minority will
allow the member to provide more symbolic representation
to the minority through low-cost gestures and actions, ce-
teris paribus. The member gains a marginal electoral ad-
vantage from the minority through such symbolic represen-
tation but will not gain that advantage at the cost of majority
support.
H2. A larger district minority group population leads
to more substantive representation provided by the
member, regardless of the attitudes of the majority
toward the minority group.
3. By the authors’ count, 12 openly gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals
have served in the House of Representatives: Gerry Studds (D-MA), Bar-
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incentive to members to devote a great deal of their limited
time and resources to providing substantive representation
to a minority group. Members must have a sufficient elec-
toral stake, in terms of having a large active minority subcon-
stituency, or a personal stake, as a member of the minority
group, as an incentive for them to provide substantive rep-
resentation.
LGBs as a political minority
To test these hypotheses, we explore the representation of
LGB Americans in the US House of Representatives. The
representation of LGBs in the House provides an ideal test
case for this theory for three reasons. First, LGBs form a
cohesive minority group with a distinct set of group inter-
ests. Research shows that LGB identifiers exhibit group co-
hesion on political matters even without group mobiliza-
tion on salient issues (Egan 2012) and exhibit largely similar
(liberal) political attitudes and voting behavior (Herek et al.
2010; Hertzog 1996; Lewis, Rogers, and Sherrill 2011; Schaff-
ner and Senic 2006). Egan (2012) notes that although sexual
orientation is unchangeable, LGBs do not have to choose to
identify. Thus, those who choose to identify as LGB tend to
exhibit cohesion on LGB issues and can be characterized as
having the “intense preferences” that Bishin (2000) argues are
necessary for a legislator to acknowledge and pay attention
to the subconstituency and its issues. LGBs also have a set
of group interests distinct from those of heterosexual voters,
who are either already granted certain rights through legal
opposite-sex marriage or do not face discrimination on the
basis of their sexual orientation. Policies that would objec-
tively benefit LGBs include bans on employment and hous-
ing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, legalized
same-sex marriage, second-parent adoption, and protection
under hate crimes laws (Lax and Phillips 2009b; Schaffner
and Senic 2006). Second, LGB populations vary across con-
gressional districts. In some urban areas such as San Francisco
and Miami, LGBs make up a larger portion of the popula-
tion compared to other, more rural, districts where very few
individuals identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. In districts
where a sufficient population dwells, LGB voters can form
one such constituency that members must appeal to in order
to win reelection. With LGB citizens perhaps comprising up
to 10% of the population in some urban areas (Gates and
Newport 2013), somemembers have a great deal to gain from
appealing to LGB voters. Third, LGBs have experienced a
surge in acceptance by the American public since 2000 (New-
port 2011). However, LGB acceptance has increased at dif-
ferent rates in different regions of the country. These differ-
ences can in part be explained by localized, personal contactbetween LGBs and heterosexuals. Among heterosexuals, be-
ing personally acquainted with gays and lesbians strongly pre-
dicts amore positive feelings toward sexualminorities (Gentry
1987; Herek and Glunt 1993; Lance 1987; Overby and Barth
2002) and greater support for gay rights legislation (Barth,
Overby, and Huffmon 2009; Barth and Parry 2009).
A critical question to be raised about this group case
selection is how pro-LGB public opinion can be separated
from generally liberal public opinion. To be sure, there is a
correlation between holding a liberal ideology and support
for LGB rights. However, as data collected for this analysis
testify, a liberal district ideology does not necessarily trans-
late into strong district support for gay rights legislation.
The Pearson’s correlation between district ideology, as mea-
sured by the 2008 vote share for the Democratic presidential
candidate, and support for gay rights legislation, as mea-
sured by district-level estimates of public opinion on same-
sex marriage obtained from multilevel regression and post-
stratification (MRP), is r p 0.165 for the period observed
(2005–11). The point can be illustrated further with anec-
dotal evidence. In 2008, California voted on Proposition 8
banning same-sex marriage. In that election, the state’s 6th
and 20th congressional districts both voted overwhelmingly
(at 74.87% and 74.33%, respectively) to elect liberal Dem-
ocrats to the House (Lynn Woolsey and Jim Costa, respec-
tively, each given an ADA rating of 80% that year). How-
ever, Woolsey’s district voted against the ban on same-sex
marriage at a rate of 69.63%, while Costa’s district voted
against Proposition 8 at a rate of 27.68%. Thus, given the cor-
relational and anecdotal evidence, liberal opinion and opinion
specific to gay rights policy are separable concepts. Further
analyses of possible selection effects in this group are pro-
vided in the online appendix.
LGB representation in the House
A small body of research has examined the effects of the
descriptive representation of LGBs in local governments
(Button, Wald, and Rienzo 1999), state legislatures (Haider-
Markel 2010; Haider-Markel, Joslyn, and Kniss 2000), bu-
reaucracies at the local, state, and federal levels of American
government (Lewis and Pitts 2009), and in the comparative
perspective of national legislatures (Reynolds 2013). Nearly
uniformly, these authors find that the increased presence
of LGB members in governing bodies positively predicts
substantive policy gains for LGB citizens. Only a handful of
openly gay and lesbian representatives have served in the
US Congress.3 In 2012, six openly gay and bisexual repre-
4. Scorecards rate House members based on their actions on approx-
imately 10 measures per term. Typically, 5–6 of these measures are votes
on germane bills or amendments. Another 4–5 measures included in the
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113th Congress the most diverse yet in terms of the sexual
orientation of its membership. These seven members con-
tinued to hold office in the 114th Congress. The relative
dearth of LGB Americans in the US House indicates an ex-
cellent context in which to examine why House members,
the vast majority heterosexual, offer substantive and sym-
bolic representation to their LGB constituents.
A cursory glance through the Congressional Record on
LGB issues suggests that representation of the group through
votes and bill sponsorships has occurred infrequently. One
reason for this record is that members of Congress are loath
to consider such controversial legislation and risk alienat-
ing either supporters or opponents of gay rights. As two ob-
servers of LGB issues in Congress note, “Gay rights issues
move through the corridors and committee rooms of Capitol
Hill in piecemeal fashion, largely because many lawmakers
prefer that they be kept off the floor of the House or Sen-
ate” (Campbell and Davidson 2000, 370). These authors es-
timate that Congress only considered 10–20 bills per ses-
sion relating to LGB interests from 1975 to 1995, the majority
of these not reaching floor votes. Although many hetero-
sexual members of Congress have voted with LGB positions
on the issues and introduced pro-LGB bills, they have of-
ten done so as a minority within their chamber and within
their party. Nonetheless, an increase in the number of bill
sponsorships in the last decade and several prominent votes
on gay rights issues (most famously, the Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell Repeal Act of 2010) have created a substantial variation
in the representation offered to LGB Americans by members
of the House.
DATA, METHODS, AND RESULTS
In the following models, the unit of analysis is the repre-
sentative by term of Congress. The outcome of interest is
the representation that members of Congress provide to their
LGB constituents. Members have the opportunity to repre-
sent the interests of subgroups within their constituencies
through a range of legislative activities, including their voting
record, bill sponsorships and cosponsorships, floor speeches,
public stances on issues, demographic composition of their
staff, caucus memberships, and appearances at events within
their district (Canon 1999; Hall 1996). Here we analyze threeney Frank (D-MA), Steve Gunderson (R-WI), Jim Kolbe (R-AZ), Tammy
Baldwin (D-WI), Jared Polis (D-CO), Mark Takano (D-CA), Kyrsten
Sinema (D-AZ), David Cicilline (D-RI), Sean Patrick Maloney (D-NY),
Mark Pocan (D-WI), and Mike Michaud (D-ME). We do not count the
several members who immediately resigned their seats when a sex scandal
or other event publicly outed them.forms of representation as dependent variables in separate
models: members’ position taking, caucus membership, and
bill sponsorship. Taken together, these are meant to capture
both symbolic and substantive representation. Specifically, we
capture symbolic representation by examining position taking
and caucus membership. We examine substantive represen-
tation by assessing the representative’s bill sponsorship ac-
tivity.
Members’ Position Taking on LGB issues form the first
dependent variable meant to capture symbolic representa-
tion. Data are collected from the Human Rights Campaign
(HRC) Congressional Scorecard. Gay rights issues in Con-
gress have been closely tracked by the HRC, a prominent
gay rights interest group, since 2001. HRC assigns ratings to
members of the House based on their voting records and bill
cosponsorships, with a rating of 0 indicating an anti-LGB
record and a rating of 100 indicating a pro-LGB record.4 We
consider these votes and cosponsorships to constitute sym-
bolic representation because of the low cost of the actions to
members in terms of time and attention. Furthermore, the
vast majority of the cosponsorships used to calculate these
ratings were associated with bills that were never brought
to the floor. While some votes included in the rating were
close and substantively important (e.g., the repeal of Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell), most votes were taken on symbolic res-
olutions, on bills unlikely to advance through the Senate or
to the president, or on bills that passed or failed by such large
margins that individual votes were rendered expressive acts.
On average, the 12 bills voted upon in the ratings were passed
or failed with a margin of about 24 votes. Ratings from the
109th to 111th Congresses (2005–11) are used in this anal-
ysis. Here, as well as for the subsequent dependent variables,
the terms selected for analysis are those in which Census data
on LGB populations, opinion estimates, and dependent var-
iable measures are all available.5
Members’ Caucus Membership forms the second depen-
dent variable capturing symbolic representation. Members
interested in symbolically representing their LGB constit-
uents could express this commitment in recent congressesrating are bill cosponsorships. Including cosponsorships in this measure on
relevant bills allows for a broader sample. The authors also measured
position taking through ideal point estimation using the Bayesian IRT
method reported by Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004). There are few
changes in the results using the ideal points measure. Full results using this
measure are reported in the appendix.
5. These three congresses also represent years in which a good deal of
attention was paid to gay rights issues on the national agenda. Party
control and the party of the president also vary over these three terms.
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has had over 100 members in each congress since its found-
ing. Therefore, we operationalize membership as a dichoto-
mous dependent variable, coded 1 for caucus members and
0 for nonmembers during the 111th Congress (the term in
which it was founded). Membership data are gathered from
the website of former caucus chair Tammy Baldwin (D-WI).
Members’ Bill Sponsorships form the third dependent var-
iable, which captures substantive representation. The de-
pendent variable is a count of the number of pro-LGB bills
sponsored by each member of the House in one term. Given
our interest in substantive representation here, we count only
those bills that provide for substantive policy changes. Thus,
we exclude symbolic resolutions from the analysis. Data on
bill sponsorships are collected in the 109th to 111th Con-
gresses and are gathered from two sources.6 First, we included
bills coded in the Congressional Bills Project as “Gender and
Sexual Orientation Discrimination,” with bills addressing
only gender discrimination and not LGB issues excluded from
the analysis. Second, we conducted a search of congressional
bills on the Congress.gov database using the search terms
“sexualorientation,” “same-sex,” “gay,” “lesbian,”and“LGBT.”
Bills from this search were included in the data only if the
substance of the bill extended legal rights or privileges to
LGBs.7
The two principal independent variables in each analy-
sis are district LGB population and district opinion on gay
rights issues. Similarly to Haider-Markel (2010, chap. 6), we
measure LGB Population as the percentage of all partnered
households in the district during each session that identify
as same-sex households.8 Data are gathered from the Amer-
ican Community Survey, which is an ongoing, annual survey
conducted by the US Census Bureau. Values of the propor-
tion of the district population identifying as same-sex cou-6. This search yielded 13 bills from 10 different sponsors in the 109th
Congress, 19 bills from 13 sponsors in the 110th Congress, and 62 bills
from 25 sponsors in the 111th Congress.
7. The search terms were included in the language of some bills that
moved policy away from the outcome preferred by gay rights groups. An
example is Tim Huelskamp’s (R-KS) “Military Religious Freedom Pro-
tection Act” (HR 3828 in the 111th Congress), which protects members of
the military from adverse action if they refuse to make accommodations
for the sexual orientation of other members (e.g., officiating over a same-
sex marriage ceremony) due to sincerely held religious beliefs. Such bills
were excluded from the data in order for the data and results to be con-
sistent across observations.
8. No question on the US Census or the American Community Survey
(ACS) asks directly whether respondents identify as lesbian, gay, or bi-
sexual. Therefore, we use the number of households with unmarried,
same-sex partners as a percentage of all respondents reporting living in
partnered households, married or unmarried.ples range from 0.21% in the Mississippi 3rd (including Me-
ridian andNatchez) to 3.28% in theCalifornia 12th (including
San Francisco). Because these data measure the number of
same-sex couples in the district, rather than the number of
LGB-identifying individuals, they differ in value from the
Williams Institute/Gallup estimates of state LGB populations
cited above (Gates and Newport 2013).
We examine the impact of both district LGB population
and broader district opinion on gay rights issues on sym-
bolic and substantive representation. As a measure of ma-
jority attitudes toward the LGB minority, we use public
opinion on the issue of same-sex marriage. Direct measures
of issue-specific public opinion at the district level are dif-
ficult to come by. However, scholars have developed multi-
level regression and poststratification (MRP) as a strategy
to estimate public opinion in states, congressional districts,
and smaller subnational political units (Gelman and Little
1997; Lax and Phillips 2009a; Park, Gelman, and Bafumi
2004; Warshaw and Rodden 2012). Using data from War-
shaw and Rodden (2012), we estimate public opinion on
same-sex marriage in each district for the period 2004–10.
Rather than aggregating estimates across several years, we
create term-specific estimates to account for the growing ac-
ceptance of same-sex marriage over the time period. Thus,
District Opinion is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to
100, with higher values representing greater district support
for same-sex marriage.9
Competing pressures apart from district composition af-
fect a member’s decision to provide substantive represen-
tation to LGB constituents. Prominent among these is the
party of the member. Because the two major party platforms
maintain opposing stances on LGB issues, members will feel
pressure to toe the party line in their actions related to LGB
issues, regardless of their own or their constituents’ opin-
ions. Thus we include the dichotomous variableDemocrat to9. According to Warshaw and Rodden (2012), these MRP estimates
are generated using a combination of individual-, district-, and state-level
predictor variables. The individual-level variables are race, gender, and
education. The district-level variables are median income, percent veteran
population, percent urban population, and percent population dwelling
in same-sex households. The state-level variables are percent evangelical
population, percent union population, and region. We do not indepen-
dently test the accuracy of these data. Warshaw and Rodden (2012, 208–
16) provide evidence that MRP estimates using these data outperform
disaggregation, ballot measure returns, and presidential vote share. They
also write that calculating estimates using more individual-level variables
(e.g., party identification) leads to very modest improvements over esti-
mates with district- and state-level variables only. In other words, the
inclusion of more individual-level variables may reduce bias, but the pay-
off is marginal. Their finding lessens our concerns that omitted variable
bias at the individual level fundamentally alters the measure or our results.
10. The sample size also changes across the models because our sim-
ulation of district opinion estimates failed to converge for five observations.
The use of multiple imputation to account for the missing cases did not
change the coefficient estimates. We report all models in this article with-
out using multiple imputation in order to provide postestimation model
fit statistics.
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and 0 for Republicans.
We also control for factors determined to be relevant to
members’ behavior on LGB issues under morality politics
and interest group frameworks (Haider-Markel and Meier
1996, 2003). Under a morality politics framework, repre-
sentatives are motivated to defer to constituent opinion on
highly salient morality issues. Members may not know the
exact percentages of their constituents who support or op-
pose specific policies, and thus they use heuristic devices
to estimate district opinion (Fenno 1978; Miler 2009). One
such characteristic is District Partisanship, measured as the
Democratic vote share in the 2008 presidential election.
Democrats have been much more likely to support LGB
rights than Republicans. Moreover, with a higher Demo-
cratic vote share, members may feel more confident in tak-
ing public positions on controversial issues such as gay
rights, since it is less likely they will lose enough electoral
support from that position to jeopardize their chances of
reelection.
We further control for factors that affect members’ be-
havior under an interest group framework. On nonsalient
issues, members work with interest groups out of the media
spotlight to draft legislation that matches the preferences of
the group and the member (Haider-Markel 1999). Thus we
include in our model Campaign Contributions, measured as
the log of the amount in dollars that the HRC donated to
members’ campaigns in the election preceding their term in
office. The variable is lagged to isolate the effects of such con-
tributions temporally and remove possible endogeneity be-
tween campaign contributions and substantive representation
provided. Data are gathered from the Center for Responsive
Politics.
Finally, members who are descriptive representatives of
a group may be more likely to offer substantive represen-
tation of that group than the general population (Haider-
Markel 2010; Lublin 1997). Hence, we include LGB Mem-
ber, a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the
member openly identifies as lesbian, gay, or bisexual (1) or
not (0).
The effect of population and opinion
on position taking
The analysis presented examines three dependent variables:
an interest group rating between 0 and 100 measuring mem-
bers’ position taking, a dummy variable measuring caucus
membership, and a count measuring the number of pro-LGB
bills sponsored. Because each dependent variable requires a
different estimation technique, we present each in a separate
table.Table 1 displays the results for ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression estimates of the effects of the independent
variables on members’ position taking. We obtained inter-
est group ratings for 1,299 members by term.10 Because we
use time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data, we include a
lagged dependent variable (Scorecard Ratingt21). We report
robust clustered standard errors to address problems of au-
tocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Because our theory pre-
dicts differences between districts will affect symbolic repre-
sentation, rather than differences within districts over time,
we include random effects for term and district. We present
three restricted models and one fully specified model, but we
limit our interpretation of the results to the fully specified
model (model 4).
To test hypothesis 1, that minority population leads to
greater symbolic representation conditioned on majority
support for the minority, we include a multiplicative inter-
action term between LGB population and district opinion.
The model yields results in line with our expectations. The
negative, statistically significant coefficient on the interac-
tion term suggests a conditional relationship between the
variables. A marginal effects plot demonstrating this rela-
tionship is presented in figure 1. According to the marginal
effects estimate, the marginal effect of the mean LGB pop-
ulation on a Democratic member’s HRC rating when district
support of same-sex marriage is at 30% is about 15.9 points
on average, when all other variables are held at their means.
This is an impressive marginal effect, given that the range
of the dependent variable is 0 to 100. When district support
increases to 70%, the marginal effect of LGB population
decreases to 1.7 points on average. As the broader public
increases its support for same-sex marriage, the magnitude of
the effect of LGB population on symbolic representation
decreases. Thus, we find support for hypothesis 1.
Partisan differences also play a major role in position
taking on LGB issues, however. Controlling for the other
factors in the model, Democrats on average score more than
30 points higher than Republicans on the HRC rating score-
card. The pro-LGB interest group campaign contributions
also have statistically significant, positive effects on represen-
tatives’ position taking. Surprisingly, as a district votes more
strongly Democratic, its representative is not more likely
to vote in favor of gay rights legislation, controlling for the
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LGB member of the House does not significantly predict a
higher rating on gay rights issues. Although the sign of the
coefficient is in the expected direction, we suspect that the
lack of statistical significance in this result is due to the small
number of openly LGB representatives serving over this time
period.
The effect of population and opinion on
caucus membership
Next we examine the factors affecting members’ decisions
whether to join the House LGBT Equality Caucus as an-
other measure of symbolic representation and another test
of hypothesis 1. On the whole, the results presented in table 2
closely reflect the results of the previous OLS regression ex-
amining members’ position taking. Because caucus member-
ship here is treated as a dichotomous dependent variable, es-
timates are obtained using logistic regression. The sample for
models 5–8 includes the 435 members in the 111th Congress,
the only term in our data set after the caucus’ formation in
2008. Because the data for this model are cross-sectional, thetime-series adjustments included in the models in table 1 are
not included here. The dichotomous variable indicating LGB
members of the House is excluded from these models because
all LGB-identifying members of the House serve as cochairs
of the caucus.Table 1. OLS Regression Results for Position Taking on LGB Issues, 109th to 111th CongressesDependent Variable: HRC Scorecard Rating(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)LGB population 5.015* 4.591* 26.585*
(1.749) (1.806) (7.099)District opinion .104* .080 .304*
(.052) (.053) (.091)LGB population # district opinion 2.356*
(.104)Campaign contributions 6.224* 6.256* 6.157* 6.109*
(.765) (.776) (.770) (.764)Democrat 29.982* 29.856* 30.362* 30.597*
(2.516) (2.493) (2.518) (2.500)District partisanship .038 .037 .036 .036
(.032) (.033) (.033) (.032)LGB member 2.636 2.792 2.782 2.594
(4.770) (4.982) (5.038) (4.937)Scorecard ratingt21 .412* .418* .408* .406*
(.038) (.038) (.038) (.038)Term random effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
District random effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 21.042 23.717 25.009 218.580*(1.647) (4.982) (3.040) (5.570)
Observations 1,299 1,294 1,294 1,294
R2 .893 .893 .893 .894Note. Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
* p ≤ .05.Figure 1. Marginal effect of LGB population on position taking given district
opinion.
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fully specified model (model 8). When population and dis-
trict opinion are interacted, we find a statistically signifi-
cant, negative coefficient estimate for the interaction term,
just as in model 4 of table 1. The predicted probability of
a Democratic member joining the caucus across a range of
district opinion and LGB population values, with all other
variables held at their means, is presented in figure 2.
Here, as in figure 1, the effects of population and district
opinion move jointly and inversely. As district support for
same-sex marriage increases, the marginal effect of district
LGB population on a member’s probability of joining the
caucus decreases. This is illustrated by the plot showing the
marginal effects of an increase in a district LGB population
at three arbitrarily chosen levels of public support. When
support is already high (65%), the LGB population does lit-
tle to affect a member’s probability of joining the caucus. The
line representing high support demonstrates a much more
gradual increase in the likelihood of caucus membership as
LGB population increases than the other lines represent-
ing medium (50%) and low (35%) support. In these latter
two cases, low district support and a small LGB population
translate to a low likelihood of caucus membership. How-
ever, the marginal effect of the district LGB population is
large; an increase in the LGB population above the variable
mean (0.64%) translates into a large increase in the likeli-hood of a member joining the caucus. Thus, the size of the
district LGB population is less persuasive to members join-
ing the caucus in districts where support is high than it is to
members in districts where support is lower.
We continue to see here that greater LGB populations
receive greater symbolic representation when majority sup-
port for same-sex marriage is high. Thus, hypothesis 1 also
receives support from this set of models. Finally, as in table 1,
the control variables measuring campaign contributions and
(in two of the four models) Democratic party affiliation exertTable 2. Logistic Regression Results for Caucus Membership, 111th CongressDependent Variable: House LGBT Equality Caucus Membership(Model 5) (Model 6) (Model 7) (Model 8)LGB population 2.533* 2.475* 16.204*
(.660) (.659) (3.899)District opinion .038* .035* .186*
(.016) (.016) (.044)LGB population # district opinion 2.225*
(.059)Campaign contributions .511* .584* .445* .385*
(.151) (.150) (.153) (.157)Democrat 2.195 1.858 2.380* 2.413*
(1.163) (1.141) (1.173) (1.171)District partisanship .028* .031* .025* .027*
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.011)Constant 28.070* 24.818* 26.258* 218.890*
(1.217) (1.349) (1.460) (3.075)Log likelihood 2139.825 2146.440 2137.487 2130.548
BIC 310.027 323.2574 311.426 303.624Note. Number of observations p 435. BIC p Bayesian information criterion. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p ≤ .05.Figure 2. Probability of caucus membership given LGB population and
district opinion.
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ship. In line with expectations, but differently than in table 1,
the results here indicate that as the Democratic vote share
in a district increases, so too does the member’s likelihood of
joining the LGBT Equality Caucus, controlling for the other
variables.
The effect of population and opinion
on bill sponsorship
Whereas the last two sets of models examined the factors
explaining why members offer minority groups symbolic
representation, our final set of models examine why they of-
fer substantive representation. We expect a different set of
factors to be at play in substantive representation than in
symbolic representation. Table 3 shows the effects of LGB
population and district opinion on the number of pro-LGB
bills sponsored by each member. Because the dependent var-
iable in these models is a count and the conditional variance
of the dependent variable is overdispersed relative to the
conditional mean, the models are estimated using negative
binomial regression.11 The sample for these models include
all members of the 109th to 111th Congresses.
Here we look for support for hypothesis 2, that a larger
minority group population leads to greater substantive rep-
resentation regardless of majority attitudes. When district
opinion and LGB population are considered side by side in
model 11, the estimate of the effect of district opinion fails
to achieve significance at the .05 level of confidence, but
higher LGB population positively predicts a higher count
of bill sponsorships. As in previous models, we consider a
conditional relationship between the two variables in model
12. The coefficient estimate for the interaction term between
opinion and population fails to achieve statistical signifi-
cance at the .05 level of confidence, though this fact in and
of itself does not rule out a conditional relationship. In re-
sults not reported here, we find the marginal effect of LGB
population given district opinion is never statistically sig-
nificantly different from zero across the range of values of
district opinion. Given the insignificant findings from mea-
sures of public opinion and based on model fit, as measured
by BIC, we report the results in model 9 (incorporating LGB
population and not district opinion) as the correctly speci-
fied model.11. We attempted to use the same estimation techniques for time-
series cross-sectional data for these models as in the position taking
models above. However, there were insufficient data for the model to be
calculated. As a result, we estimate this negative binomial model using a
lagged dependent variable, fixed effects for terms, and robust clustered
standard errors, but no unit effects for districts. A full explanation of the
modeling choice is presented in the appendix.Turning to the control variables, the only variables that
consistently have a significant impact on substantive repre-
sentation across the models are LGB Member and Spon-
sorshipt21. Taken as a whole, these models suggest that the
only three factors significantly and consistently affecting
the substantive representation of LGB constituents are (i) the
size of the group in the district, (ii) the descriptive represen-
tation of the group in elected office, and (iii) past represen-
tation of the group. Overall, we find support for hypothesis 2,
that an increase in the size of the minority group positively
affects the substantive representation the group receives re-
gardless of majority attitudes.
We present expected counts of bill sponsorships based
on estimates from model 9 in figure 3. The predicted count
displays differences between LGB and non-LGBmembers by
their districts’ LGB populations. The predictions are based
upon the number of bills likely to be sponsored by Demo-
cratic members of the House with all other variables held
at their means. The figure shows that, while district LGB
population influences members’ bill sponsorship activity, de-
scriptive representation has a substantially larger effect. Het-
erosexual members of Congress are predicted to sponsor one
gay rights bill only when they have a very large LGB popu-
lation in their district (3% of the populaton), controlling for
other variables. LGB members, on the other hand, are pre-
dicted to sponsor one gay rights bill when 1.5% of their con-
stituents are same-sex couples.
DISCUSSION
In majoritarian political institutions, minority groups must
work especially hard to achieve representation in the insti-
tution. However, the size of minority groups interacts with
majority opinion in ways that affect the type of represen-
tation that the minority receives. The population of the
minority group in a constituency influences the level of sym-
bolic and substantive representation minority groups re-
ceive. Representatives pay attention to minority subconstit-
uencies in their districts, even if the population of the group
is small. Across the empirical models, we find that the LGB
population of a district exerts a statistically significant, pos-
itive influence on the representation provided by its mem-
ber in the House, even controlling for other relevant fac-
tors such as member partisanship and district partisanship.
The finding that the LGB population matters to representa-
tion is particularly impressive given the fact that, across all
districtsmeasured, the percentage of same-sex couples among
all partnered couples in the data set never exceeds 3.28%.
Representatives are aware of even small groups in their dis-
tricts and, if possible, work to represent their interests in
Congress.
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stantive representation is direct, its effect on symbolic repre-
sentation is conditioned by majority opinion. We find thatas the minority population grows, members have a greater
electoral incentive to provide substantive representation to
that minority, particularly when the group is vocal and shares
intense preferences on certain policy issues (Bishin 2009).
Members are willing to do the hard, behind-the-scenes work
in legislative bodies if they can gain the support of the mi-
nority, regardless of majority opinion. However, the extent
to which minority populations can influence their represen-
tatives to offer symbolic representation (cynically put, “lip
service”) is heavily dependent on majority attitudes. On one
hand, when public opinion toward the minority is unfavor-
able, minority populations can have a large effect in con-
vincing their representative to provide them with greater
symbolic representation. On the other hand, when public
opinion is already favorable to the minority, the presence of
the minority in the district adds no additional pressure on
representatives to offer symbolic representation.
Relatedly, our results show that different sets of actors
influence different forms of symbolic and substantive rep-
resentation. For symbolic forms of representation, such asTable 3. Negative Binomial Regression Results for Pro-LGB Bill Sponsorships, 109th to 111th CongressesDependent Variable: Number of Sponsorships(Model 9) (Model 10) (Model 11) (Model 12)LGB population 1.362* 1.168* .853
(.552) (.559) (4.015)District opinion .047* .035 .031
(.020) (.019) (.047)LGB population # district opinion .005
(.064)Campaign contributions .273 .316* .255 .257
(.146) (.132) (.138) (.141)Democrat .606 .562 .707 .702
(.793) (.795) (.780) (.773)District partisanship .018 .017 .014 .014
(.011) (.016) (.011) (.011)LGB member 2.450* 2.605* 2.533* 2.539*
(.306) (.465) (.388) (.399)Sponsorshipst21 1.239* 1.190* 1.134* 1.134*
(.473) (.402) (.452) (.452)Term fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 27.046* 28.812* 28.786* 28.569*(1.014) (1.445) (1.375) (3.035)
Observations 1,305 1,300 1,300 1,300
Log likelihood 2224.297 2225.282 2222.693 2222.689
BIC 520.333 522.266 524.257 531.420Note. Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses. BIC p Bayesian information criterion.
* p ≤ .05.Figure 3. Predicted count of pro-LGB bill sponsorships given LGB popu-
lation.
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campaign contributions and party affiliation play a role in
determining members’ behavior. However, for substantive
representation, members respond largely to minority influ-
ence, as measured by minority population in the district
and minority descriptive representation in the body itself.
We draw the conclusion that while broad support from the
majority can help the minority achieve broad societal sup-
port and eventual policy change, minority incorporation into
political institutions is essential for making sure that issues
important to the minority find a place on the agenda.
We should note that the models presented here may suf-
fer from problems of endogeneity that are inherent in all
research on representation. It may be that constituent voices
and demands cause their representatives to be responsive
to their concerns, but it also could be that members antici-
pate constituent demands and act responsively to head off
the threat of losing reelection. Alternatively, and fitting with
past work on public opinion and representation, members
of Congress may find themselves using their own judgment
more frequently as broader attitudes toward the LGB pop-
ulation continue to shift, even if their judgment contradicts
district opinion (Herrera, Herrera, and Smith 1992; Pitkin
1967).
The present work posits and tests hypotheses from a
broad theory of minority representation applicable to var-
ious groups. We find evidence that a minority group pop-
ulation, even when small, matters to the group’s symbolic
and substantive representation provided by elected officials.
However, the effect is conditioned by the attitudes of the
broader public toward the minority groups. Although this
article tests the theory on only one group, LGB Americans,
future research may apply the theory in the context of other
minority groups.
The findings presented here have mixed normative im-
plications for representative democracy. The results show
that the political influence minority groups exert is affected
by the opinion of the majority population toward the group.
Representatives are responsive to majority district opinion,
perhaps at the cost of minority representation. Essentially,
this research confirms that Madison was correct to be con-
cerned for the rights of the minority in the face of an “in-
terested and overbearing majority.” Encouragingly, how-
ever, the results suggest that even small minority groups can
secure the representation of their views by their legislative
representative, even if that member does not identify with
the group, through continued visibility and organizing at
the district level. The challenge for representative democracy
is the translation of localized support for minority rightsinto broad representation of those rights at the national level
in a demographically heterogeneous society.
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